The public-company
earnings that move
consumer brands.

What these
reports cover.

The biggest public companies report the weather that smaller brands are about to operate in. Meta and Google tell you where CPMs are heading. Shopify and Klaviyo tell you which features are getting roadmap priority. Affirm and PayPal tell you how the consumer is actually spending. The public DTC brands are your closest comps, and the CPG majors are the acquirers. This tracker logs every earnings print since 2020 from that roster, with a plain read on what each one means for you.

It covers every reporting wave since 2020. The 2026 waves so far are the Q4 2025 and full-year reports released from late January through March, the Q1 2026 reports released from April through June, and the Q2 2026 reports landing from July into August. Every figure ties to the company's own investor-relations release or its SEC filing. The two sections below give the collective read on the current wave and the one before it; the five layer tables that follow give the company-by-company detail and the operator read on each. If you want to jump straight to the takeaways for a smaller brand, skip to what smaller brands should do.

The Q2 2026 read,
in three parts.

Reported from July into August, the Q2 2026 wave came down to one thing on the media side: reaching a customer got more expensive on every scaled platform at once. Meta's average price per ad rose 12% while impression growth thinned to 14% from 19% a quarter earlier, so the auction is clearing on price rather than on supply. Amazon's advertising line accelerated again to plus 26%, its third consecutive quarter of speeding up. The challengers stopped being a hiding place too. Snap's North American ARPU jumped 23% on a North American audience that shrank 7%, Pinterest's US and Canada ARPU rose 14% on 4% more users, and Reddit's US ARPU rose 51% on 6% more US users. Those are the same sentence written three ways. The platforms are monetizing the audience they already have far harder, because they are not finding many new people. The independent alternative did not participate. The Trade Desk grew 3%, missed the guidance it set in May, and guided Q3 below the quarter it had just finished, in the same fortnight that Amazon's ad line grew 26% and Reddit's grew 64%. That is budget consolidating into the walled gardens, so the open internet is not the cheap escape hatch from CPM inflation. Budget Q4 on higher CPMs everywhere, not just on Meta and Google.

Underneath the media story, a lot of very good-looking gross margins were not what they appeared. IEEPA tariff refunds landed in the June quarter and they are sitting inside the DTC margin lines. Warby Parker printed 57.9% against 53.0% a year ago, but roughly 500 basis points of that was an $11.8 million refund, which puts underlying gross margin at about 52.9%, essentially flat. There were 162 basis points of the same thing inside Revolve's 56.6%. At e.l.f., roughly 1,050 of 1,400 basis points of expansion came from refunds, and Toast booked about $10 million of it straight into adjusted EBITDA. None of that is pricing power and none of it repeats. Do the subtraction before you benchmark against any of these companies, then notice which ones raised guidance afterwards and which only reaffirmed it. FIGS is the one worth studying on that test. It booked the same kind of refund, worth about 780 of its 820 basis points of gross-margin expansion, but the quarter holds up without it. Net revenues grew 28.8%, active customers grew 13.2%, revenue per customer grew 10.1% and order value grew 8.5%, all in the same three months. Then it raised the full year and added $100 million to the buyback. The others needed the refund to make the margin line look like progress. FIGS put its progress in the demand metrics, where a refund cannot reach.

The last thread is that growth is increasingly purchased rather than earned. Celsius grew 11% while the CELSIUS brand itself shrank about 11.7%, with every point of growth coming from Alani Nu and Rockstar, both acquired, and gross margin down 340 basis points to carry them. Block's fastest-growing line was not payment processing at plus 13% but consumer lending originations at plus 59%. HubSpot added 14% more customers and only 4% more revenue per customer, with billings growing six points slower than revenue. Commerce.com's merchants grew GMV 14% while the platform's own revenue was flat. More often than not this quarter, the headline number and the engine underneath it pointed in different directions, which is exactly when a founder should be reading the segment tables instead of the press release.

The Q1 2026 read,
the wave it built on.

The Q1 2026 wave, reported from April into June, set up everything above. Ad costs on the dominant platforms re-accelerated. Meta's average price per ad rose 12% year over year, up from 6% a quarter earlier, on top of 19% more impressions, and it raised full-year capex guidance to $125B to $145B to keep improving the auction. Amazon's advertising grew 24% to a business now over $70B on a trailing basis, and Google Search ads held plus 19% with management saying AI was adding queries rather than eating inventory. For a smaller brand, that means budgeting for higher CPMs on Meta, Google, and Amazon, not lower ones.

Underneath the price inflation, the consumer looked resilient but value-conscious. The BNPL names all grew volume in the low-to-mid 30s percent with benign credit, and both Affirm and Klarna described the consumer as financially healthy. But PayPal's branded checkout grew only 2%, and in packaged goods the food and beverage giants still grew almost entirely on price while volumes stayed flat to negative. The real volume recovery showed up in home and personal care, beauty, and health-positioned food: P&G returned to volume-led growth across all ten of its categories, Unilever's underlying volume jumped to plus 2.9%, and prestige beauty kept recovering on fragrance and China.

For the public DTC brands, Q1 was a lesson in fragility and discipline. Tariffs hit gross margins across hardgoods and apparel, and the winners defended margin with selective price increases and higher-margin mix rather than discounting, with On and FIGS actually raising guidance through it. The sharpest warning came from Oddity, whose revenue swung from plus 25% to minus 26% purely because one ad platform's acquisition cost roughly doubled. The durable brands leaned on retention (Chewy's 84% Autoship base) and channel mix (YETI's wholesale carrying a soft DTC quarter) rather than paid-traffic volume. That contrast, between brands that own their demand and brands that rent it, is the throughline of the whole wave.

The Q4 2025 and full-year reports before it, released from late January through March, are the baseline both waves extend. Ad-price inflation was already underway but milder, with Meta's price per ad up 6%. Reddit's ad revenue grew 75% and its ARPU 42%, the first sign of how fast a cheap channel reprices. Shopify posted its first quarter above $100B in GMV and framed 2026 around funding Catalog, Sidekick, and a Google-co-developed Universal Commerce Protocol so AI agents transact through its checkout rather than around it, while Klaviyo, Braze, and HubSpot all shipped AI agents into general availability with usage-based pricing. In packaged goods it was pricing-led and volume-flat: Mondelez grew on nearly 10% pricing while volumes fell almost 5%, and P&G's organic growth was zero. Every 2026 theme in this tracker was visible in those reports first.

Ad platforms:
who sets your CPMs.

These are the companies whose earnings calls move your cost of traffic. The pattern in 2026 is a split: the big three (Meta, Google, Amazon) are getting more expensive, funded by record AI capex that makes their auctions better-targeted and more competitive, while the challengers (Snap, Pinterest) stayed cheap and Reddit and AppLovin are the ones to watch. Each company's print is linked below to its filing.

The practical move is diversification before the challengers reprice. Meta and Google will keep taking price because their AI capex keeps making the inventory more valuable, so the offset is creative volume, first-party data, and a deliberate presence on the cheaper channels while they are still cheap. Before you raise a paid budget against these CPMs, pressure-test the unit economics: our free break-even ROAS calculator and max allowable CAC tool tell you what a rising CPM environment can actually support.

Commerce infrastructure:
what gets built next.

These earnings calls are the clearest read on which features your platforms will prioritize and where the upsell pressure is heading. The dominant 2026 theme is agentic commerce and AI-native tooling: Shopify is funding it hardest, and Klaviyo, Braze, and HubSpot are all shipping AI agents into production with usage-based pricing. The one laggard is Salesforce Commerce Cloud, flagged as a drag even as Agentforce crossed $1B in ARR.

The signal for a Shopify brand or app founder is that the roadmap budget is flowing to AI discovery, agentic checkout, B2B, and Markets. Wiring into those early aligns you with where the platform is investing rather than against it. For how this maps onto the broader stack a brand assembles as it scales, see the agentic commerce playbook for Shopify brands.

Payments and BNPL:
the real-time spend read.

Payments volume is the closest thing to a live feed on discretionary spending, and BNPL is the sharpest slice of it. The 2026 read is a healthy-but-selective consumer: the pay-over-time names grew volume in the low-to-mid 30s percent through the first half with benign credit, while the incumbent wallet and seller layer grew only modestly, a sign that growth is concentrated in financing-enabled purchases and new merchant supply, not broad per-customer expansion. Klarna's Q2 print is the first crack in that pattern, with volume growth slowing to 18% and the company pointing at German retail rather than at the consumer broadly. US volume in the same quarter still grew 27%, so read the deceleration as geographic. Affirm's FQ4 print on August 27 settled it: GMV grew 36% and revenue 33%, with GAAP operating margin doubling to 13%. The slowdown sat in Klarna's largest market, not in the method.

For a DTC brand, treat BNPL as a live conversion and average-order-value lever, because the data says financing-enabled purchases are where discretionary demand is actually growing, but do not assume the rising-tide checkout environment that PayPal's numbers say does not exist. One more data point for the backdrop: Stripe stayed private through 2026 but disclosed $1.9 trillion in 2025 payment volume, up 34%, so money is still moving at scale even with public-market payments multiples under pressure. In July it reportedly bid $53B for PayPal, and what a Stripe and PayPal merger would mean for your checkout and fees is the read that matters to a merchant.

Public DTC brands:
your closest comps.

These are the brands you can actually learn from, because they disclose the mechanics: gross margin, channel mix, marketing intensity, and how they are handling tariffs and paid acquisition. Three lessons run through the 2026 prints: tariffs are eating margin and the fix is pricing and mix, not discounting; single-channel acquisition is dangerous; and retention plus omnichannel is what separates the durable from the fragile.

The Oddity print is still the one to sit with, and it now has a full year behind it. A high-margin, high-repeat, 96%-DTC brand has spent four quarters shrinking because one ad partner's acquisition cost spiked, and it has just guided the fifth to roughly a 5% decline. That is the single-channel risk every DTC founder carries, measured across a year rather than a quarter, and it is the first step in how consumer brands actually shut down, which in 2026 is almost never weak demand and almost always a balance sheet that could not absorb a shock. Oddity could absorb it, and the receipt is on the balance sheet: cash down to $561M from $776M while it retired about a fifth of its own shares. The healthier models sit in the same table. Revolve raised marketing to 16.5% of sales to launch its own label and got 11% active-customer growth back for it, and Chewy runs an 84.6% Autoship base that grew faster than the company did. If you want the framework for which of these levers matters at your stage, the DTC growth inflection points piece maps it out.

CPG strategics:
demand and the acquirers.

The large CPG companies are two signals at once: a read on category demand, and the acquirers who might one day buy your brand. In 2026 the demand read split along category lines, with center-store food and beverage still growing on price while volumes stayed flat, and a real volume recovery in home and personal care, beauty, and health-positioned food. On the deal side, the majors kept buying niche, high-velocity brands.

The M&A appetite is the part a founder should not miss. Church & Dwight said it plainly, that it is hunting "market-leading" fast-moving-consumable brands and paying up for high-velocity niche names, and PepsiCo, Estée Lauder, Unilever, and Colgate all bought growth in 2026. That is a live exit door for a scaled, growing DTC brand. For the deal-side view of who is buying and at what price, see the 2026 consumer M&A window explainer. The earlier stage of the same money flow, which brands private capital is backing before a strategic ever calls, is logged in the 2026 consumer raises, round by round.

What a smaller brand
should do with this.

The point of reading the majors is to act before the effect reaches you. These are the specific moves a smaller consumer brand should make off what these companies reported in 2026.

Budget for CPM inflation and diversify off it. Meta, Google, and Amazon are taking price and will keep doing so while their AI capex compounds, so model rising blended CPMs into your plan rather than hoping for a reversion. The offset comes from three things working together: creative volume, first-party data, and a deliberate, funded presence on the cheaper channels (Snap, Pinterest, and Reddit and AppLovin as they open) while they are still underpriced. For a brand that scaled straight through this cost environment, how IM8 grew to $200M in 19 months is worth studying, because it held $1.44 of gross profit for every $1 of CAC while doing it.

Adopt your platform's AI priorities early. Shopify is funding Catalog, Sidekick, and agentic checkout; Klaviyo and Braze are shipping AI agents. When a platform tells you where its roadmap budget is going, the features it names get the investment, the integrations, and eventually the ranking preference. Being early on agentic checkout and AI discovery is cheaper than being late.

Treat BNPL as a conversion and AOV lever, not a nice-to-have. The clearest growth in discretionary spend is running through pay-over-time, with healthy credit behind it. Offering Affirm, Klarna, or Afterpay at checkout is one of the few tailwinds the data actually supports, because the broad rising-tide checkout environment that PayPal's numbers rule out is not coming to rescue your conversion rate.

Build a gross-margin and sourcing cushion for tariffs. Every hardgoods and apparel brand in the comps ate a tariff hit to gross margin, and the ones that held up (On, FIGS) had the margin headroom to absorb it and the pricing power to pass some through. If your margin is thin and your sourcing is single-country, that is the exposure to fix before the next tariff headline, not after.

Go omnichannel and lead with retention. "DTC" now means omnichannel: YETI's wholesale carried a soft direct quarter, Warby and FIGS added stores, and e.l.f. leaned on retail shelf. The brands that held up did it on retention and subscription (Chewy) rather than paid-traffic volume, and owning your demand is the entire lesson of the Oddity print. To pressure-test where your own economics sit, the free Shopify store audit and the DTC growth scorecard are a fast starting point.

IPO and S-1 watch.

New filings are their own signal: an S-1 is the first time a private brand's real numbers become public, and it resets the comp set. The table tracks the 2026 consumer and commerce IPO activity worth watching, updated as new filings and listings land.

Reformation is a result now rather than a filing, which makes it the more useful benchmark. A profitable, roughly 90% DTC apparel brand priced at the bottom of its range and opened flat. Public investors will take a healthy DTC P&L. They just will not pay a growth multiple for it, and at $15.00 the deal cleared at under 2x the $507.1M FY25 top line. Once Upon a Farm closed day one up 17%, Suja Life down 15%, and Reformation flat, which is roughly what an open but ungenerous window looks like from the inside. Tailored Brands finds out next what that window pays, having rebuilt out of a 2020 bankruptcy around a rental business running an 85% selling margin.

Jersey Mike's listed on July 30 at $23.00, the biggest of the three and the odd one out. It is a 3,300-store franchise system, so it collects royalties on stores its franchise owners paid to build. That is why $4.3B in systemwide sales runs through a company booking well under a billion of its own revenue. Reformation and Tailored Brands own their sales. Jersey Mike's owns the brand and lets operators fund the footprint.

Oura is the newest filing and the one worth reading closely if you sell a physical product. Hardware still does the heavy lifting at $974.0M of the nine-month revenue, but membership is the line that compounds: $240.5M, up 121%, against 74% growth overall. That is a hardware company getting a subscription to attach without surrendering its device margin, which is what most connected-product brands try and miss. The $924.3M figure on the common-stockholder line will get quoted as a loss. It is a $985.0M deemed dividend booked against preferred stock ahead of the listing, and the operating business made $71.2M over the same nine months.

How this tracker
is built.

Every figure here ties to a primary source: the company's own investor-relations press release, or its SEC filing (an 8-K, 10-Q, 6-K, or F-1). The links in the tables go to those documents, not to secondary coverage. Where a metric came from an earnings call rather than the release, it is treated as reported. Nothing is estimated or invented. If a number could not be verified against the company's own disclosure, it was left out.

That second sentence used to be aspirational. On September 18, 2026 I checked it the obvious way, by reading the link targets, and 18 of 86 pointed at trade press rather than at an issuer document. All 18 have been repointed at the company's own 8-K exhibit or results release. Two are on a corporate newsroom rather than EDGAR, because adidas and Beiersdorf are not SEC registrants and have no EDGAR filing to point at. The sweep also caught two report dates that were a day or two off the release, now corrected to Sprouts on July 29 and Beiersdorf on August 3, and one row that should never have existed: Olaplex was shown with a Q2 print it never made, because Henkel took it private on July 7 and the row had been built from a scheduled earnings date that calendar sites never retracted. That row now records the take-private instead. Replacing 18 links is more work than rewriting one sentence, which is the reason to do it that way round: softening the claim would have removed the problem from view without removing it.

Each row's guidance is true as of that row's report date, not as of today, and companies revise outlooks between prints at investor days and in Item 7.01 filings. Those events have no quarter and no revenue figure, so they do not fit a row keyed on a reporting period, and they used to have nowhere to live. They are now tracked separately in the ledger, and where one supersedes a table cell the row says so and names the date. Commerce.com is the live example: its August 6 guidance was raised on September 10.

The window covers every reporting wave since 2020. The 2026 waves so far are the Q4 2025 and full-year reports released from late January through March, the Q1 2026 reports released from April through June, and the Q2 2026 reports landing from July into August. Fiscal calendars vary, so some companies report offset quarters (Affirm's fiscal year ends in June, e.l.f.'s and Estée Lauder's in June or March, Salesforce and Braze on a January year-end, the European CPG names on half-year and quarterly trading updates), and each row notes the actual period. The "operator read" column is my own interpretation of what each print means for a smaller brand, not the company's guidance.

This page is refreshed daily. As new earnings prints and S-1 filings land, they are added to the tables and the collective reads are updated, and the underlying data lives in a maintained ledger alongside the 2026 consumer M&A and funding tracker. The Q2 wave is complete. Q3 begins reporting in October, so the tables will fill out again through late October and November. If a company you care about is missing, it is either outside the consumer-brand-weather roster or it had not reported inside the window, not an oversight.

The latest report
from each company.

One line per company, its most recent report, grouped by layer: 47 companies in all.

Every report published
in 2026, by quarter.

The 132 reports published in 2026, newest first, in the calendar quarter they were published.

Who is on
the roster.

Earlier years,
on their own pages.

Each year from 2020 has its own page with every report published that year, by quarter.

What the ad platforms
said about pricing.

The 15 ad-market figures the platforms disclosed in these reports, as a change on the prior year.

Questions I get about
reading these earnings.

Which public companies most affect DTC and consumer brands?

Are ad CPMs going up in 2026?

What do 2026 earnings say about consumer spending?

What is Shopify prioritizing in 2026?

How is this earnings tracker sourced and kept current?